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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
Department Editor: Bernard R. Balch*
LIABILITY FOR CROP-DUSTINGS INCE the advent of modern pest-control methods there have been only
nine reported decisions dealing with the question of liability for dam-
ages resulting from serial crop-dusting, yet significantly, six of this number
have been decided within the last two years, displaying the growing impor-
tance of airborne pest-control operations.' All of the earlier decisions held
the "flying farmer" liable for damages, yet half of the- recent cases have
absolved him of all liability. This development may be attributed either
to the specific facts of each case, or may be a part of the general trend of
the courts to lessen the degree of care required of owners and operators of
airplanes with regard to injury to persons or property on the ground.
The typical case2 envisages the farmer employing an aviator experienced
in "dusting" crops by air, to spray his fields with a poisonous substance
designed to obviate the pending destruction of his crops from harmful pests.
In this operation damage occurs to crops,$ or animals,4 on adjacent prop-
erty. The injured party then seeks judicial aid in gaining reparations for
the resulting damage. The basis of recovery is invariably negligence on
the part of either the operator of the aircraft of the farmer who promoted
the dusting.5 The types of negligence generally alleged are: failure to cut-
off the dusting equipment when passing over adjacent property,6 operating
*Student Editor, Legal Publications Board, Northwestern University School
of Law.
I Agricultural flying, including crop-dusting, was a major topic of discussion
at the recent Second Annual National Agricultural Aviation Conference at Fort
Worth, Texas. Civil Aeronautics Administrator D. W. Rentzel in his address to
the conference said agricultural flying is a most promising field, and that hebelieved it is "just getting started." Rentzel cited CAA figures showing that1,724 operators are using 4,906 planes in crop-dusting, spraying, seeding, fer-
tilizing, and defoliating, 227 companies are making equipment used in such
operations and 19 schools are giving courses in agricultural flying. American
Aviation Daily, March 10, 1950, p. 59. The CAA also reported in June 1950 that
there had already been 1200 applications for waivers necessary for low-flying
spraying operations. In 1949 the total number of applications for the year was
265.
2 The facts of the simple case exemplified here, are almost universally com-
mon wherever crop-dusting damage occurs. In all of the reported decisions
discussed in this note, the typical facts are present. If other facts altering the
situation have occurred, they will be indicated.
3 Damage to Crops: Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor,... Ark...., 222 S.W.(2d) 820 (1949); Burns v. Vaughan,... Ark...., 224 S.W. (2d) 365 (1949);
Kennedy v. Clayton,... Ark...., 227 S.W. (2d) 934 (1950).
4 Damage to Bees: Gerard v. Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503, 27 P. (2d) 678 (1933);
Miles v. Arena Co. et al, 23 Cal. App. (2d) 680, 73 P. (2d) 1260 (1937); Lund-berg et al v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259, 194 P. (2d) 454 (1948) ; Jeanes v. Holtz et al,...
Cal. App...., 211 P. (2d) 925, (1949); Lenk v. Spezia et al.... Cal. App....,213 P. (2d) 47 (1949); Damage to Livestock: Hammond Ranch Corp. and Homer
Ricks v. Dodson and Williams, 199 Ark. 846, 136 P. (2d) 484 (1940).
5 The exception to this statement occurred in Chapman Chemical Co. v. Tay-
lor,... Ark...., 222 S.W. (2d) 820 (1949) (the manufacturer of the chemical
dust was held liable for negligence in not running tests with reference to the
volatility of the dust).
6 Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson and Williams, 199 Ark. 846, 136 S.W.
(2d) 484 (1940).
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the dusting equipment during high winds,7 failure to give notice of the
dusting operation to adjoining landowners,8 and finally, a lack of care in
not investigating the highly volatile nature of the poison used in the "dust-
ing" operation.9
Gerard v. Fricker,0 the first decision posing the question of crop-dust-
ing liability, involved the typical fact situation previously set forth. Both
the airplane owner and the farmer employing the pilot were held liable for
damages to the adjoining landowner caused by the drifting of the poisonous
dust. The major issue on appeal was the defendant's assertion that the
dusting company employed was an independent contractor, and that there-
fore the defendants farmer was not liable for any damages suffered by the
plaintiff. This assignment of error was denied with the court announcing
that crop-dusting by aircraft was per se "inherently dangerous," and there-
fore the defendant could not delegate the work to an independent contractor
and thus avoid liability.1 The language of the court in speaking of the
"inherently dangerous" nature of the work, said, "This is especially true
where the agency or means employed to do the work, if not confined and
carefully guarded, is liable to invade adjacent property, or the property of
others, and destroy or damage it."112 This language is slightly ambiguous
for the "agency or means employed to do the work" may mean either the
mode of transportation utilized, or the poison dropped from the airplane.13
The court probably meant the latter for the cases cited by the court as
authority for this proposition deal with the use of poisons for fumigation
and pest-control purposes, administered on the ground.14 If the court was
referring to the aircraft itself as "inherently dangerous," the proposition
is wholly unsupported.
Miles v. Arena Co.,15 the next decision, and the first of a series of Cali-
fornia decisions, held the promoter-farmer of the dusting operation liable
7 Miles v. Arena Co., 23 Cal. App. (2d) 680, 73 P. (2d) 1260, (1937).
8 Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259, 194 P. (2d) 454 (1948) ; Jeanes v. Holtz,
... Cal. App...., 211 P. (2d) 925 (1949).
9 Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor,... Ark...., 222 S.W. (2d) 820 (1949);
Burns v. Vaughan,... Ark...., 224 S.W. (2d) 365 (1949); Kennedy v. Clayton,
Ark...., 227 S.W. (2d) 934 (1950).
10 42 Ariz. 503, 27 P. (2d) 678 (1933).
11 The general rule is that an employer of an independent contractor is not
liable for the torts of the contractor or the contractor's servants. Restatement,
Torts §409 (1934); 57 C.J.S. §584 and cases there cited. Where though, the
work is inherently or intrinsically dangerous, liability for harm caused cannot
be evaded by employing an independent contractor, for in such cases the employer
is responsible for the contractor's failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent
harm resulting from the dangerous nature of the work. Restatement, Torts
§427 (1934); 57 C.J.S. §590. "Inherently dangerous" means not only that the
work itself or the instrumentalities used are such as can be safely performed
only by the exercise of special skill and care, but also that the work, if unskill-
fully and carelessly done, involves a grave risk of serious property damage,
bodily harm or even death. Comment, RESTATEMENT, TORTS §427 (1934)). See
further 23 A.L.R. 1084.
12 42 Ariz. 503, 507 (1933).
13 Many states had early considered the airplane to be a modern novelty of
transportation, dangerous in operation. Section 5 of the UNIFORM STATE LAW
FOR AERONAUTICS imposed absolute liability for damages by aircraft to persons
or property on land or water, unless the injured party was at fault. See, RHYNE,
AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW 65 et seq. (1947). Fourteen of the twenty-three states
which have adopted this section on surface injuries have retained the feature of
absolute liability. These states are listed at 235 CCH AVIATION LAW SERVICE
p. 11002, §11000 et seq. (1943).
14 Medley v. Trenton Investment Co., 205 Wis. 30, 236 N.W. 713 (1931);
St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Madden, 77 Kan. 80, 93 Pac. 586 (1908).
1523 Cal. App. (2d) 680, 73 P. (2d) 1260 (1937).
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for damages caused the plaintiff's nearby apiary, due to the drifting of
poisonous dust on a windy day. Although the case was decided four years
after the Fricker Case, supra, neither counsel cited it in the briefs, and the
court thought that this was a case of first impression in this country. They
reasoned that the fact situation presented, drifting of poisonous dust to
adjacent property, was similar to drifting smoke, dust, noxious gases or
similar substances originating on the defendant's property, and that the
defendant should be responsible in damages for the resulting nuisance. The
court did not speak of crop-dusting as "inherently dangerous," nor did the
issue of shifting the liability to the independent contractor arise. In fact,
the court said, "It must be conceded that, in itself, dusting vegetables to
kill pests that prey upon them is a necessary and lawful operation which
the owner of the vegetables may perform, either himself or through his
servants, or may have performed by an independent contractor. However,
he should not do the dusting, or have it done, ,under conditions which would
indicate to a reasonably prudent person that damage to his neighbor would
result.16 From these words, it may be deduced that the California court
was not holding the farmer or the "duster" to the high degree of care that
the Arizona court felt necessary in the Fricker Case, supra, and that in the
future the courts should allow the common law defenses to be raised.
The third of the three early decisions, Hammond Ranch Corp. and Homer
Ricks v. Dodson and Williams,17 presented facts very similar to those of the
Fricker Case, supra, with the court here ruling that crop-dusting was "in-
herently dangerous" and thereby denying the defendant's attempt to shift
the liability to the "independent contractor-duster."' 8  No cognizance was
taken of the nuisance theory of the Arena Case, supra. Thus, prior to 1948
both the Arizona and the Arkansas courts held crop-dusting to be "inher-
ently dangerous," resulting in absolute liability, whereas the California
court in the Arena Case, supra, held the defendant to a degree of care no
higher than. that of a reasonably prudent man.
In three of the next six cases, decided within the last two years, the
defendant has avoided liability. In Lenk v. Spezia et al,'9 notice of the
dusting operation had been given to the plaintiff, but he failed to take
1623 Cal. App. (2d) 680, 683, 73 P. (2d) 1260, 1262 (1937).
17 199 Ark. 846, 136 S.W. (2d) 484 (1940).
18 Shifting of liability to the independent contractor-duster was again at-
tempted in the most recent of these decisions, Kennedy v. Clayton,... Ark.... ,
227 S.W. (2d) 934 (1950), but the Arkansas court adhered to the rule of Gerard
v. Fricker, the landmark case, in holding that the promoter's responsibility may
not be delegated to an independent contractor thereby evading liability, as the
task undertaken was of an "inherently dangerous" nature.
In Britton v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 248 Wis. 549, 22 N.W.(2d) 525 (1946), the employer of the aviator was held liable for compensation
in the death of the employee during a crop-dusting operation. On appeal, it was
contended that the canning company which had engaged the crop-duster for the
farmer-employer was liable for such compensation. Held, the decedent had not
performed services directly for the canning company as the farmers owning the
fields had the final determination as to whether the land would be "dusted" or
not. The test adopted by the court was that if the canning company had been
bound under contract with the farmers to dust the peas at its own expense and
had equipment which it operated for that purpose, they, the canning company,
would have been liable for the compensation.
19 ... Cal. App...., 213 P. (2d) 47 (1949). This court lingered at great
length over the problems relating to the duty owed trespassing honeybees. The
court proceeded on the assumption that bees are domestic animals and resolved
that wanton and malicious conduct and intent to injure and destroy was needed
for recovery when trespassing bees are injured. But see, 2 Bl. Comm. 391 (Gavit
Ed.) (1941), where bees are considered ferae naturae capable of only qualified
property ownership.
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precautions to protect his apiaries, whereas on previous occasions he had
screened the beehives, thereby protecting his honeybees. The burden of
proof on the plaintiff was very difficult as others in the area had also
sprayed their fields about this time, and the. understandable difficulty of
proving which poisonous dust had caused the death of the hives was insur-
mountable. The defense of contributory negligence was allowed by the
California court, and the defendant prevailed.
In Jeanes v. Holtz et al,20 another California decision, the plaintiff al-
leged that no forewarning notice had been given of the dusting operation
as required by statute, 21 and that his bees had been damaged thereby. The
court answered this contention by stating baldly that notice would not have
stopped the bees from wandering, and their resultant contact with the
poison. This district of the California Court of Appeals it seems, did not
have the advantage in point of time, of the Spezia decision, supra, decided
the next month by another appellate district, where the notified farmer's
failure to screen his beehives resulted in denial of recovery.22 Here the
plaintiff did not have that precautionary warning, and yet was denied recov-
ery, for he had failed to assert that the resulting damage was occasioned
by the bees contacting the poison on his own property. The court adopted
some dictum of an Arizona decision, Lundberg et al v. Bolon,23 which indi-
cated that where the bees come in contact with the dust as trespassers,
recovery must be denied. A question might be raised as to a bee's capacity
to be considered a trespasser. The defense of trespassing of bees might
be countered by a theory of license, for the plaintiff should not be heard
to call them trespassers, after he has previously accepted the benefits of
their cross-pollination. This question may soon have to be answered by the
courts, for damage to apiaries seems to be the most prevalent harm occa-
sioned by dusting operations in the majority of the rep6rted decisions. 24
In the third case in which the farmer escaped liability, Chapman Chemi-
Cal Co. v. Taylor,25 the action was originally brought against a rice grow-
ing company for damages caused plaintiff's cotton crop. The defendant rice
company filed a cross-complaint, in the nature of an interpleader, against
the manufacturer of the chemical dust, 2,4-D,20 alleging either joint liabil-
ity, or complete liability on the part of the manufacturer. The basis of the
cross-complaint was similar to Cardozo's reasoning in the case of MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Car Co., 27 in that the chemical company failed to perform
tests on the floating power of the dust prior to its being offered for sale.
The defendant rice company was absolved of all liability, but the chemical
company was held accountable for the damage done by the use of such an
"inherently dangerous" article on the principle that "where the thing, when
put to the use for which it was intended, by reason of defects which were
known, or by the exercise of reasonable care could have been known by the
manufacturer, and the injury results from such use, the manufacturer is
Zo... Cal. App...., 211 P. (2d) 925 (1949).
21 Rules and Regulations of the Director of Agriculture, §1(c), issued pur-
suant to CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL CODE §150 (Deerings, 1944); repealed by
CALIF. STAT. 1949, c. 1043, §1. For present pest-control regulations in California,
see the CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL CODE §§160.1-160.9 (Deerings, 1949).
22 See further Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259, 194 P. (2d) 454 (1948)
(question of liability turned exclusively on the issue of notice).
23 Ibid.
24 See note 4, supra.
25... Ark...., 222 S.W. (2d) 820 (1949).
26 The chemical name of 2,4-D is dichlorophenoxyacetic acid.
27 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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liable. ' 28 A showing was made by the rice company that it had sought
counsel as to the intended use of the dust prior to purchase, and that a high
degree of care in applying the dust had been exercised by their pilot. This
decision seems to fall within the scope of the "inherently dangerous" rule
adopted by this same Arkansas Court in the Hammond Ranch Case, supra,
thereby obviating the necessity of proving a defect in the dust other than
its highly poisonous nature. Quite possibly this same result would have
been reached under the California "reasonably prudent man" test, for the
damage incurred here would have been forseeable if the highly volatile
nature of the dust had been discovered in pre-marketing tests. Five months
after the Chapman Chemical Case, Burns v. Vaughan29 was decided by the
same court. The identical issues were raised with regard to the extreme
volatility of the 2,4-D dust, and both the farmer and the chemical manu-
facturer were held liable for the resulting damage. The manufacturer did
not appeal the adverse judgment, and on appeal by the farmer the Arkansas
court affirmed for the plaintiff. The court placed the onus upon the de-
fendant-farmer, for he had constructive notice of the possible harm as
previous dusting damage had recently occurred in the locality. Besides
this failure to act upon such notice, the pilot of the aircraft continued to
spray the defendant's fields during a high wind, although his instructions
were not to do so. The court advanced the proposition that the defendant
farmer could have avoided the damage by seeking advice with regard to
proper application of the spray from the federal agricultural agent in his
county, appointed specifically for that purpose3 0 It was this type of in-
formation that was not available to the farmer in the Chapman Chemical
Case, thereby allowing him to shift the liability to the manufacturer of the
chemical dust.
In the Chapman Chemical Case, and Burns v. Vaughan, the Arkansas
Supreme Court warned that the promoter of a "dusting" operation should
gain adequate knowledge of the methods of "dusting" to be employed, com-
mensurate with the destructive propensities of the 2,4-D spray utilized.
In spite of this warning, the most recent crop-dusting case, Kennedy v.
Clayton,81 found the defendant again lacking this vital information, to his
detriment. Even though safety precautions were employed by the defend-
ant, the court felt that ordinary care was insufficient, and that the defend-
ant should have exercised a degree of care commensurate with "known"
danger. Although the defendant-farmer was held liable in this case, the
last-mentioned test of liability by the Arkansas court seems to be a far-cry
from the absolute liability normally rendered under the "inherently dan-
gerous" test, and seems to be a more lenient stand approaching the "rea-
2 S Ibid.
Evidence presented in the Chapman Case, displayed to the amazement of the
manufacturer of 2,4-D, that the spray vaporized in the air, and spread for miles.
This showing certainly substantiated the court's warning of great danger that
might occur if tests are not made when the sprays are placed on the market.
29... Ark...., 224 S.W. (2d) 365 (1949).
30 38 Stat. 373 (1914), 7 U.S.C. §342 (1939). "Cooperative agricultural
work shall consist of the giving of instruction and practical demonstrations in
agriculture ... to persons . . . in the several communities, and imparting to such
persons information on said subjects through field demonstrations, publications,
and otherwise . . ." Section 341 of the same title, provides for agricultural aid
and instruction at any federally endowed agricultural college cooperating with
the agricultural extension program.
U... Ark...., 227 S.W. (2d) 934 (1950). All three crop-dusting cases
involving 2,4-D, the volatile "dust," have been decided by the Arkansas Supreme
Court. It seems to be the most satisfactory chemical available for spraying rice
fields, but is certain death for broad-leaved plants, thereby requiring great care
in its usage.
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sonably prudent man" test first adopted by the California courts. Such a
-test allows flexibility in determining what damage is foreseeable by the
reasonable man under the peculiar circumstances of the activity, and alle-
viates the harsh penalty experienced by defendants where the "inherently
dangerous" test is applied with almost certain liability.
It is hoped that from these relatively few cases some semblance of work-
able solutions may be found. It is relatively difficult to prescribe definite
requirements, but the following are suggested to the promoter of crop-
dusting ventures as guides in avoiding damage to adjacent property and
resulting liability.
(1) Obtain complete information concerning the poisonous nature of the
-dust, its volatile propensities, and the proper methods of spreading by air-
craft. Such information should be readily available from either the manu-
facturer of the chemical, his local representative, or from the local county
agricultural agent. 32 If the dust does not seem suitable for the airborne
operation, substitute a more easily controlled chemical.
(2) Hire only experienced, capable and reliable pilots, for the stigma of
the "inherently dangerous" rule does not allow the shifting of liability to the
pilot under the independent contractor rule.33
(3) Publish notice of the intended "dusting" in the local newspaper, and
wherever possible, contact adjacent landowners personally, informing them
of times, dates, and suggested precautions they may take.34 The cases
indicate that notice, if given, may shift the burden of loss for the resulting
damage to the adjacent landowner, if he failed to observe precautionary
measures.
3 5
(4) Be explicit in the instructions given the pilot. Inform him that care
must be taken in cutting-off the spray a safe distance before adjacent prop-
erty is crossed in making turns for the return run.36 The time of the cut-off
should vary with the volatility of the dust, otherwise even slight wind will
carry the poison for hundreds of yards resulting possibly in damage and
liability. This last factor should be one of those discussed with the manu-
facturer of the dust, and the county agricultural agent.
(5) In conjunction with the pilot, and the United States Weather Serv-
ice, obtain sufficient weather data, wind velocity and direction in particu-
lar, to enable pilot to choose the proper weather in which to operate. The
pilot must be informed that all "dusting" is to cease when the wind reaches
32 See note 30, supra.
33 CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL CODE §§160.2, 160.6 (Deerings, 1949) provide
for the registration, licensing, and examination of all pest-control operators using
aircraft. Such control, if properly enforced would aid immeasurably in cutting
down damage resulting from negligence of the operator.
34 Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259, 194 P. (2d) 454 (1948) (liability turned
specifically on question of notice) ; Burns v. Vaughan,... Ark...., 224 S.W. (2d)
365 (1949) (recent dusting operations by others considered constructive notice
to defendant) ; Contra: Jeanes v. Holtz,... Cal. App...., 211 P. (2d) 925 (1949)(failure of statutory notice held not proximate cause of damage, but see note 35,
infra.).
35 Lenk v. Spezia,... Cal. App...., 213 P. (2d) 47 (1949) (failure to take
precautionary measures after notice was given, held, contributory negligence,
resulting in denial of liability).
36 Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson and Williams, 199 Ark. 846, 136 S.W.
(2d) 484 (1940) (employer held liable when pilot did not cut off poison when
circling over plaintiff's pastures, causing injury to livestock).
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a velocity making any operations precarious.3 7 Test runs should be made
with an observer on the ground viewing the possibilities of danger. Flag
signals might possibly be employed to inform the pilot of the success or
imminent failure of the spreading operation.
Although many of these suggestions seem elementary, a recurrence of
these factors has appeared in the reported decisions as forerunners of lia-
bility, thereby necessitating notice of them in all "dusting" operations in
order to satisfy the courts' standard of a high degree of care. The position
first assumed by the California court, and the present implication of a simi-
lar tendency on the part of the Arkansas court not to apply the "inherently
dangerous" rule to all crop-dusting operations is an encouraging sign. It
indicates that aerial crop-dusting, along with other phases of aviation, has
come of age, and no longer is a mode of transportation that is to be penal-
ized for its swiftness and flexibility. Despite this enlightened view of the
use of aircraft, the aforementioned precautions should be observed, for the
courts still recognize dangers inherent in the poisons used in aerial crop-
dusting.
JAY L. OLSCHANSKY*
S7 Miles v. Arena Co., 23 Cal. App. (2d) 680, 73 P. (2d) 1260 (1938) (dust-
ing operations took place on windy day resulting in damage to an apiary; held,
the defendant should have exercised extreme care so as not to injure the property
of others. Operating in strong winds resulted in harm foreseeable by the de-
fendant).
*Student, Northwestern University Law School. Competitor Legal Publica-
tions Board.
